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I. INTRODUCTION 
Panoptir:. (1) Considering all parts or elements 
(2) Broad in scope or content1 
The ability to access and utilize ideas and information is critically important to 
creativity, innovation, competition, and a democratic culture.2 New works are 
produced by authors and artists drawing on earlier masterpieces for inspiration. 
Scientific breakthroughs occur in such fields as medicine and engineering as 
researchers further advance the pioneering discoveries of their predecessors. 
Industry leaders, as well as recent entrants to the trade, improve upon existing 
products and develop new ones as a result ofdata obtained from the marketplace. 
Citizens equipped with the appropriate knowledge have the necessary tools to 
actively participate in civic and cultural affairs. 
Ingenuity and social progress clearly do not take place in a vacuum, but are 
cumulative in nature. In fact, "[n]othing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, 
is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each 
new creator building on the works of those who came before."3 A prodigious 
public domain4 is therefore essential as it contains the foundational materials 
necessary for societal advancement.5 
1 See Dictionary.com Unabridged (vol. 1) (2006),http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pa 
noptic (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); WordNet Seatch 3.0, http:/ /wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 
(enter "panoptic" in "word to seatch for"). 
2 Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Doti1ain: Threats and Opportunities, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 170. 
3 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
4 Attempts to define the term "public domain" have been the topic of considerable academic 
debate as well as the subject ofnumerous scholatly articles. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air 
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 354, 361-62 (1999) ("The public domain is the range of uses of information that any person · 
is privileged to make absent individualized facts that make a particulat use by a patticulat person 
unprivileged."); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction ofthe Public Do,nain, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2003, at 33-74; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORYL.J. 965, 968 (1990) (defining the public domain as a "commons that includes those aspects 
ofcopyrighted works which copyright does not protect"); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins andMeanings ofthe 
Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 256 (2002); Samuelson, supra note 2, at 148. The term 
"public domain" as used in this atticle consists of all non-copyrightable information, as well as the 
unprotected components of copyrighted works. Such a definition would necessarily comprise 
specific limitations atticulated in the Copyright Act in addition to uses that would qualify as fair use. 
For further discussion concerning the conceptualization ofownership interests in the public domain, 
-~~~ . . 
5 See White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski,}., dissenting) ("Creativity is impossible without a rich 
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Unfortunately, the public domain appears to be diminishing as the recent 
trend in formulating information policy is to utilize an organizing concept of 
private property ownership.6 Increasingly, all unremunerated uses of ideas and 
publicdomain.");LAWRENCELESSIG, THEFUTUREOF·IDEAS: THEFATEOFTHECO!V[MONSJNA 
CONNECTED WORLD 250 (2001) ("Creation is always the building upon something else."); William 
Patry, The Enu1JJerated Poivers Doctrine and Intellectual Properry: A11 I111mine11t Co11stitutio11al Collisio11, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 381 (1999) (With unfettered access to facts, the public may gain valuable 
information necessary for an enlightened citizenry, while later authors are free to create subsequent 
works utilizing those facts."); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evo/vi11g i11 Cyberspace, 15 J .L. & COM. 509, 
510 (1996) ("We cannot be creators without a robust public domain-a rich tradition and culture 
to draw upon freely."). 
Despite the significant body ofliterature that recognizes the importance ofaccess to an ever­
expanding public domain, this belief is far from universal. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract 
and Copyright, 42 Haus. L. REV. 953 (2005) (advocating for the use of property rights and private 
ordering through contracts as the ideal mechanisms for picking up where intellectual property 
protection leaves off). Such a perspective arguably provides part of the undercurrent of support for 
the increasing propertization of information. See discussion i1ifiw Part III. Such a viewpoint is 
further evaluated in Part V of this Article, which ultimately refutes the advantages of a model that 
makes economic efficiency the central goal. A detailed debate on this topic, however, is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
6 See infra Part III; see also Boyle, supra note 4, at 39 ("That baseline-intellectual property rights 
are the exception rather than the norm; ideas and facts must always remain in the public domain-is 
still supposed to be our starting point. It is, however, under attack. Both overtly and covertly, the 
commons of facts and ideas is being enclosed."); Maureen Ryan, C)berspace as Public Space: A P11b/ic 
Tmst Paradig1JJ for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 692 (2000) ("The prevailing 
proprietary attitude toward cyberspace vests control in private interests that are free to exclude 
whomever they choose."). 
Although a detailed discussion on the topic is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth 
noting that a body ofscholarly literature has developed that supports expanded intellectual property 
rights as a method for increasing the public domain. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and 
Copyrig/1t, 42 Haus. L. REV. 953 (2005) (advocating for the use of property rights and private 
· ordering through contracts as the ideal mechanisms for picking up where intellectual property 
protection leaves off); R. Polk Wagner, I'!farlllatio11 Wants to Be Free: I11tellectual Proper!), and the 
M,ythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003) (arguing that increasing the control of 
information goods through property rights is likely to enlarge, rather than diminish, the quantity of 
"open" information in the public domain). These scholars argue that society benefits from 
additional intellectual property rights as they provide further incentives for artists and innovators. 
They contend that without strong property rights, many works would not be generated and 
eventually become part of the public domain upon expiration of their term of protection, as these 
producers would not be able to restrict the dissemination oftheir works and hence recover the total 
costs associated with their creation. Furthermore, this increased appropriabilit:y of information 
allows the owners through contracts to engage in price discrimination, ultimately leading to a vastly 
greater universe ofpotential users. Additionally, as perfect control ofintangible, nonrivalrous goods 
is impossible, the resulting spillover from this incomplete capture leads to a direct contribution of 
public knowledge. Wagner, mpra, at 1010. 
There are a number ofsignificant deficiencies associated wjth such a line of reasoning. First, 
it is not at all clear that additional property rights will even encourage the further production and 
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information are perceived as unacceptable.7 This is attributable in significant part 
to the fact that lawmakers and adjudicators have failed to account for the multi­
dimensional problems involved in controversies concerning access to or the use 
of knowledge resources. 
Legislators and judges have instead taken a remarkably myopic view of 
property rights. Rather than recognizing the competing interests implicated in 
conflicts involving data-related materials, the focus invariably turns to ascertaining 
the owner of any easily identifiable tangible property, such as a computer system 
or website server.8 In cases where this is not present, the original producer of 
information contained within tangible property, often in the form of computer 
software, is ordinarily viewed as possessing predominant proprietary rights. 9 
Furthermore, once these "owners" 10 are recognized, they are generally granted 
all of the rights traditionally associated with ownership, including the right to 
exclude.11 Additionally, all other claims are typically viewed as irrelevant.12 
exchange of works. More importantly, these arguments fail to account for the likely impact 
significant enclosure ofraw materials will have on the ability of future artists and innovators to create 
new works. While scholars point to price discrimination as a means of increasing transfer of 
information, there is no guarantee the purported owners of these resources will make them available 
at reasonable prices or that transaction costs will not inhibit such exchanges. Furthermore, relying 
upon the purported spillover from imperfect control of such works to expand the public domain 
seems imprudent, particularly in light of the proliferation of contracts and technological measures 
now increasingly employed to cure any such perceived inadequacies. See infra Part III. 
7 Seegenera!fyJessica Litman, Copyright andIllftmllation Po/iry, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 
1992, at 206 ("Courts increasingly see uncompensated uses ofcopyrighted works as invasions of tl1e 
rights in the copyright bundle."); see also Ryan, supra note 6, at 647, 661. It does not seem as though 
this development is directly attributable to legislators and judges adopting an incentive-based 
theoretical ideology in order to furtl1er expand the public domain. See mpra note 6 (discussing 
scholarship advocating for increased private property rights as a means for enlarging the public 
domain). Instead, this state of affairs can be much more readily ascribed to the significant lobbying 
activities ofintellectual property rights holders and the resultant legislation that has expanded such 
rights. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession; Intellectual Proper(:y, and the Sin ofTheoretical Ho111ogeneify, 
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 912 (2007). 
8 See infra Part III; see also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
9 See infra Part III ( discussing the possible rationale for this predilection). 
10 See infi"a Part III (discussing whether a private individual should be able to own factual 
information, either by confen-ing such rights directly or indirectly by granting the means by which 
to exercise complete control of access to and the use of such information). 
11 See ziifra Part III. 
12 see JOSEPH WIWAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 189 (2000) 
("This either/ or reasoning misconstrues the character of property rights. It presumes tlmt the 
relevant question is 'Who is the owner?' and that once that o:vner is identified, others' claims have 
no legal standing."); see also infra Part III. 
6 
y: 
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Consequently, this allows for tight control of the information contained on or 
within the tangible property. Although in limited circumstances generally 
unrestricted power may seem reasonable, usually it is not.13 Moreover, such an 
approach permits the carefully balanced provisions of copyright to be displaced, 
typically to the detriment of the public.14 As a result, data that was once freely. 
available has increasingly become inaccessible as a result of legislatively and 
judicially sanctioned contractual and technological constraints.15 Furthermore, 
these impediments to public access to ideas and information are particularly 
troublesome in light ofthe fact that "[p]reventing access is now often tantamount 
to preventing use."16 
These legislative and judicial decisions generally fail to acknowledge the 
benefits that inure from a diverse, open exchange of information.17 This is due 
in large part to the fact that the traditional conception of tangible property 
ownership is usually centered on determining a solitary owner.18 As such, the 
inquiry employed generally lacks the capacity to envisage the existence ofmultiple 
owners or non-owners with legitimate interests that at times should take priority.19 
Moreover, this analysis fails to adequately acknowledge that the way in which we 
structure property rights is reflective of the type of society we wish to create and 
13 See i,y'ra Part III. 
14 See genera/bi Keith Aoki, (IntellectuaJ Property and Sovereignry: Notes To1vard a Cultural Geograp!qy 
efAuthoriry, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295-99 (1996) ("[I]he deeply embedded image of original 
authorship in our intellectual property law has now come to justify ever-increasing property rights 
in information itself-a result directly counter to understandings of early English and American 
copyrightlaw, which prohibited unauthorized copying oftexts precisely to promotewider circulation 
of the ideas, knowledge, and information contained within such literary works."). 
15 See inji"a Part III; see alsoJacqueline Lipton, Injom1ation Properry: Rights andResponsibilities, 56 FLA. 
L. REV. 135, 145 (2004) ("Courts and legislatures have played a significant role in over-propertizing 
information...."). 
16 Jacqueline Lipton, A Frameworkfor Information Law and Polil:JI, 82 OR. L. REV. 695, 762 (2003). 
17 See infi·a Part III; see also Mark A. Lemley, Place and yberspace, 91 CALL. REV. 521, 532-33 
(2003) ("Courts have assumed not only that cyberspace is a place akin to the physical world, but 
further that any such place must be privately owned by someone who has total control over the 
property. This is a common assumption these days; it sometimes seems as though our legal system 
is obsessed with the idea that anything with value must be owned by someone."); see also SINGER, 
st,pra note 12, at 26. Although not in the context of information or intellectual property, Singer's 
remarks with regard to recent trends in both politics and law concerning property generally are 
particularly relevant: "In thinking about property, our organizing concept is 01vnership. We want to 
identify a person or entity as the owner of every resource, and our assumption is that the owner has 
a full bundle ofpowers over the property and that those powers are close to absolute." Id. (emphasis 
in original). 
18 See inji·a Part III.A; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 189. 
19 Such parties arguably include the public. See i1ifra Part III.(: ( discussing the possibility that the 
p1fblic could be considered the affirmative owner of materials in the public domain). 
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the values we find irnportant.20 We therefore need to adopt a more appropriate 
theoretical framework to evaluate conflicts which may result in the contraction of 
the public domain. 
Despite the arguable incongruity associated with applying traditional models 
of tangible property rights to controversies concerning intangible resources,21 the 
foundation of the panoptic approach draws on the work of several leading 
academic writers who haveproposed alternative conceptions oftangible property 
rights.22 The panoptic approach begins by focusing on the identification of all 
relevant parties and societal values at issue in a given controversy, as opposed to 
searching for a solitary entity upon which to confer the label of "owner."23 
Building on this baseline, the analysis next turns to the prospect of balancing all 
of these interests, which necessarily includes an examination of the content 
involved and the context within which the information controversy occurs.24 By 
utilizing this framework, judges and policy makers would be compelled to 
confront the value choices they are making in fashioning information rights 
policies, while also recognizing the role that property law plays in shaping social 
relations as well as the marketplace. 25 As a result, the panoptic approach more 
20 See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Properry: A Special 'Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 
1046 (1996) ("Questions about the kind of society that we are, and the kind of society that we wish 
to become, must be inherent parts of the interpretation of [property rights]."); see also STEPHEN R. 
·MUNZER; ATHEORY OF PROPERTY 149 Gules Coleman ed., 1990) ("Property discloses much about 
societies and persons. . . . First, for all societies, if one describes the institution of property as it 
exists in a society, the description reveals something important about that society."); JEDEDIAH 
PURDY, FORCrnvll\10NTHINGS: IRONY,TRUST,AND COMMITMENTIN AMERICA TODAY 131 (1999) 
("Every law and every political choice, is in part a judgment about the sort of countrywe will inhabit 
and the sorts oflives wewilllive.");JOSEPHWIIllAMSINGER, THEEDGESOFTHEFIELD: LESSONS 
ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 91 (2000) ("[Property] is about creating the ground rules for 
fair social relationships."); SINGER, supra note 12, at 155; Lipton, supra note 15, at 173 ("Property 
ownership, like information property ownership, has powerful social consequences."); Ryan, supra 
note 6, at 647 ("JI]t is important to identify the values we are promoting when resolving current 
issues regarding information as property."). 
21 See itifra Part V (summarizing briefly the arguments for and against the use of a tangible 
property model in the intangible property context). 
22 This foundation is heavily influenced by the entitlement theory proposed by Joseph William 
Singer, most notably in his book ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY, supra note 12. 
It bears mentioning, however, that other property theorists, in particular Laura Underkuffler, have 
also advocated for the utilization of a more comprehensive method of conceptualizing property 
rights. See infra Part IV. 
23 See i1ifra Part V.B. 
24 See iefra Part V.C. 
25 See i1ifra Part V; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 154-56. Singer briefly mentions intellectual 
property and competition, focusing much of his discussion on Apple Computer's claim that the 
Microsoft Corporation had infringed its icon-based user interface. Commenting on the case, he 
states as follows: "The case revolves around a conflict between property and competition. . . . The 
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accurately portrays the effects that decisions concerning knowledge resources 
have on the continued existence of a prodigious public domain. 
This Article begins in Part II by examining the constitutional and legislative 
backdrop pertaining to content protection. The treatment of facts and ideas 
under the basic principles of copyright law are briefly reviewed. Part III analyzes 
the causes of the increased propertization ofknowledge resources and the effects 
on the public domain. This Part begins by reviewing the inherent deficiencies of 
conventional models of tangible property rights. Next, it discusses the substantial 
complications that have arisen as a result oflawmakers and adjudicators utilizing 
absolute conceptions of tangible property ownership in formulating information 
policy. In connection with this analysis, the resurgence of the common law claim 
of trespass in cyberspace, the heightened use of digital rights management 
systems, and the proliferation ofcontracts that effectively displace rights afforded 
by copyright law are examined. Lastly, this Part seeks to conceptualize ownership 
ofmaterials that are part of the public domain. Specifically, it reflects on whether 
these resources are defined by a complete absence of ownership or, alternatively, 
whether the public as a whole should be deemed the owner of such materials. 
~art IV reviews the entitlement model articulated by Joseph William Singer 
and supplements this discussion with the work ofother leading tangible property 
theorists who have advocated a more comprehensive approach.to conceptualizing 
tangible property rights. Part V first contends with the arguments against drawing 
on tangible property theories to resolve controversies involving information, but 
ultimately concludes that the considered utilization of such analogies may 
sometimes be appropriate. Next, this Part describes in detail the contours of the 
panoptic approach. Additionally, it includes a review of representative data­
related disputes, illustrating how the panoptic approach provides an analytical 
framework that more readily takes into account the multi-dimensional nature of 
conflicts concerning knowledge resources. 
II. FORMULATING AN INFORMATION RIGHTS POLICY: 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP 

Until recently, copyright law26 has generally served as the initial starting point 
from which issues relating to the production, use, and ownership ofinformation 
court's decision in disputes like this will have an enormous impact on the structure of the 
marketplace and on social relations. . . . The conflict between property and competition can be 
understood as a conflict between property rights." Id. 
21
' This is not to suggest that other intellectual property regimes such as patent law are not 
concerned with issues involving the free flow ofinformation. Copyright law, however, tends to deal 
most directly with the tension between private protection and public access to information resources. 
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resources are decided.27 The carefully considered constitutional and statutory 
limitations on protection are designed to strike an appropriate balance between 
the rights of creators and the competing interests of the public.28 However, in 
resolving these tensions, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
primary objective of such intellec,tual property rights is not to provide a private 
gain. Instead, the principal goal is to ensure that the public benefits.29 In 
particular, this includes preserving society's substantial."interest in the free flow 
of ideas, information, and commerce."30 
In order to accomplish these goals, the Copyright Act provides protection 
only to "original works of authorship."31 However, originality is not merely a 
statutory requirement but also a constitutional prerequisite for the benefits of the 
Act to attach to any given work.32 For a work to be deemed· "original," it must 
be "independently created."33 Generally this necessitates a finding that the work 
has not been copied from another work and that it also possesses "at least some 
27 Nonetheless, copyright law clearly does not provide answers to· all of the complicated 
questions regarding information policy. Instead a much more sophisticated analytic framework is 
needed to take account of overlapping issues related to property rights, contracts, and First 
Amendment concerns, to name just a few. See discussion infra Part II regarding the limitations of 
copyright law. 
28 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
("I.D]efining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted ... involves a difficult 
balance between the interests ofauthors and [society]."); see alsoJessica Litman, Revising CopyrightLaw 
far the I11Jor111ation Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 33 (1994) ("For much of this country's history, ·public 
dissemination was, except in very limited circumstances, a condition ofcopyright protection. While 
no longer a condition, it is still fair to describe it as a goal of copyright protection."). 
29 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 (2003) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 
123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.")); Feist 
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The primary objective of 
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts."); Sol!)' Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited 
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's 
statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and 
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts."). · 
30 Sol!)' Corp., 464 U.S. at 429. 
31 17 U.S. C. § 102 (2000). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to "secure for limited Times to Authors ... 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings"); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (declaring that 
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement"). 
33 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
I 
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minimal degree of creativity."34 These requirements do not usually pose a 
considerable obstacle, particularly since a relatively low level of creativity will · 
usually suffice.35 
Nonetheless, facts do not meet this modest threshold. One of the "most 
fundamental axiom[ s] ofcopyright law" is that "[n] o author may copyright ... the 
facts he [or she] narrates."36 This is because one who reports a particular fact has 
not created it but has merely discovered its existence.37 Since factual data is not 
"original" in the constitutional sense, it is not entitled to protection but may 
instead be copied at will.38 As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]his result is 
neither unfair nor unfortunate[, but] is the means by which copyright advances 
the progress of science and art."39 
Similarly, ideas also are not subject to copyright protection. A basic principle 
of copyright law, the "idea/expression" dichotomy, allows copyright protection 
to attach to the expression ofan idea, but not the idea itself. 4°Consequently, one 
may utilize the ideas contained within another's copyrighted workwithout seeking 
the creator's permission.41 Accordingly, this provides "authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas . . . 
conveyed by a work."42 This balance of rights between authors and the public is 
rooted in the belief that society is best served by the unrestricted flow of such 
resources.43
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, all or part of the protected 
portions ofa copyrighted work may be used without the consent of the copyright 
holder. The CopyrightAct contains a number ofprovisions that expressly restrict 
the exclusive rights granted by the statute to the owner of the copyright.44 Many 
of these limitations pertain only to particular types ofuses by certain categories 
of individuals in specific situations;45 however, not all of the exciptions are so 
34 Id. (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§2.01 [A]-[B] (1997)). 
35 Jd 
36 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
37 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347-48 ('No one may claim originality as to facts ... because facts do 
not owe their origin to an act o.f authorship.") (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, 
§2.0l[A]-[BJ, and Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.1981)). 
38 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. 
39 Id. at 350. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 350-51. 
42 Id. at 349-50. 
43 Id. 
44 See 17 U.S.C. §§ lOi--122 (2000). 
45 See, e.g., id.§ 110 ("Notwithstanding the provisions o( section 106, the following are not 
infringements of copyright: ... (6) performance of a nondramatic musical work by a governmental 
11 
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:, specialized. For example, the doctrine of fair use is much more far-reaching, 
·; 
often allowing the use of excerpts from a work for such purposes as teaching, 
news reporting, and criticism without compensating or seeking the permission of 
the copyright holder.46 
By providing adequate protection for authors so that they have an incentive 
to create, but precluding a copyright owner's ability to control all uses of such 
works, the Constitution and the Copyright Act ensure that prospective creators, 
innovators, and participants in democratic culture have the necessary raw 
materials to draw upon in the future. The public domain therefore serves as an 
invaluable communal asset. 
Nevertheless, to view this as the public domain's exclusive role would be to 
understate its significance. As one leading commentator explains, 
To characterize the public domain as a quid pro quo for 
copyright ... is to neglect its central importance in promoting the 
enterprise ofauthorship. The public domain should be understood 
not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but 
as a device that permits the rest of the system to work. ... 47 
The various functions the public domain performs can therefore be described as 
nothing less than pivotal. However, this essential commons of information is 
presently under considerable threat as the ability to access and use its resources 
has become progressively more difficult and in many instances entirely 
impossible. 
Ill. OVERPROPERTIZATION. 
Material that used to reside in the public domain is steadily being transformed 
into private property. 48 Facts and ideas, once viewed as fundamental components 
body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course ofan annual agricultural 
or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by such body or organization...."). 
46 Id.§ 107. 
47 Litman, supra note 4, at 968; see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and De,nocratic Culture: A 
Theory ofPreedom ofExpression for the Infonnation Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004) ("To make 
intellectual property consistent with the idea of free speech as democratic culture, there must be a 
robust and ever expanding public domain with generous fair use rights."). 
48
• See Boyle, supra note 4, at 39 ("That baseline-intellectual property rights are the exception 
rather than the norm; ideas and facts must always remain in the public domain-is still supposed to 
be our starting point. It is, however, under attack. Both overtly and covertly, the commons of facts 
and ideas is being enclosed."); Ryan, s,pra note 6, at 692 ("The.prevailing proprietary attitude toward 
cyberspace vests control in private interests that are free to exclude whomever they choose."). 
1. 
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of the public domain, are now seen as "valuable commodities in the 
contemporary marketplace."49 Unprotectable portions of copyrighted works are 
increasingly looked upon as beingwithin a content producer's purview ofcontrol. 
Fair use and other similar limitations articulated in the Copyright Act are 
perceived as unwarranted subsidies.50 Uncompensated uses of information are 
continually regarded as intolerable.51 
Such rapid privatization has occurred as a result· of judges and lawmakers 
willingly acceding to the vociferous demands of content producers without fully 
appreciating the impact ofsuch decisions. 52 This is attributable in large part to the 
fact that the contemporary trend in fashioning information rights policy is to 
employ an organizing concept of private property 'Ownership heavily influenced 
by conventional tangible property theories. 53 As discussed in Part Ill.B, 
application of these traditional theories to disputes concerning tangible property 
49 Ryan, supra note 6, at 669-70 (" 'Recently, the basic principle that copyright protects neither 
ideas nor information has eroded, as copyright owners have found strategies to prevent the 
disclosure and dissemination of ideas and information that have become valuable cqmmodities in 
the contemporary _marketplace.' " (quoting Litman, supra note 7, at 187)); see also Lipton, supra 
note 16, at 738; Litman, s11pra, at 1294-95; Patry, supra note 5, at 368 ("Copying such material 
promotes the progress of science by keeping the basic building blocks of knowledge free for all to 
use."). 
so See Jane C. Ginsburg, A11thors and Users in Copyright, 45 ]. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1, 15 
(1997); Robert P. Merges, The End ofFriction? Property Rights and Contract in the ''Ne11Jtonian" World of 
On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 115, 134-35 (1997); see also Ryan, supra note 6, at 687 
(discussing why viewing fair use as a subsidy is misguided). 
51 Litman, supra note 7, at 206; Ryan, supra note 6, at 661 ("[I]he neoclassical economic theory 
shaping current doctrine has consistently and drastically cut back on limitations in copyrights, while 
at the same time expanding an author's proprietary rights to creative works. Increasingly, the courts 
and Congress view all uncompensated uses of copyrighted works as intolerable 'invasions of the 
rights in the copyright bundle.' . . . Despite a broad rhetorical recognition of a societal claim to 
access to information, the application of copyright doctrine to the digital environment is 
unmistakably focused on the privatization ofelectronic-mediated information." (foomote omitted)). 
52 See infra Part III ( discussing trespass actions, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as well 
as breach of contract claims for examples of this tendency); see also LESSIG, supra note 5, at 180 
(' [I]he real danger ... is not that copyrighted material would be uncontrolled: the real danger is that 
copyrighted material would be too peifect/y controlled. That the technologies that were possible and 
that were being deployed would give content owners more control over copyrighted material than 
the law of copyright ever intended .... But now, not only Congress but -also the courts have been 
doubly eager to back up their protections with law." (emphasis in original)); James Boyle, A Politics 
of Intellectual Property: .Environmentalism far the Net?, 47 DUKE LJ. 87, 115 (1997) (asserting that 
intellectual property rights are expanding without public analysis of checks). 
53 See SINGER, supra note 12, at 26 ("In thinking about property, our organizing concept is 
oivnership. We want to identify a person or entity as the owner ofevery resource, and our assumption 
is that the owner has a full bundle ofpowers over the property and that those powers are close to 
absolute.'' (emphasis in originaD), Although Singer does not discuss this idea within the context of 
information, such an application seems to be particularly appropriate. See infra Part V. 
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is problematic. However, when utilized in connection with the tesolution of 
controversies or the development ofpolicies that implicate information resources, 
· such problems are altogether magnified. 
A. CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The dominant modern idea of tangible property ownership "is understood as 
[a right] to possess [property] as an exclusively private thing."54 The oft-quoted, 
quintessential definition of property rights is Blackstone's characterization as 
" 'that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right ofany other individual 
in the universe.' " 55 Concededly, even Blackstone recognized that such an 
extreme view did not adequately describe reality. 56 Nonetheless, such a theory of 
property rights has pervaded our view of tangible property through the ages and, 
as detailed below, continues to impede clear thinking on the matter with regard 
to information-based resources.57 
Traditional models of property ownership confer rights within delineated· 
boundaries, dividing the area from which an "owner rules from the space where 
the owner's rights cease and non-owners take over."58 Additionally, these 
formulations of ownership generally assume that an owner possesses virtually 
complete control over the property within its designated borders.59 The 
54 JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH AREMBRANDT 3 (1999); see also LESSIG, supra note 5, 
at 86 ("[W]e live in a time when the dominant view is that 'the whole world is best managed when 
divided among private owners.'") ( quoting Carol Rose, The Comeefy ofthe Commons: Custom, Commerce, 
andlnherent/y Public Property, 53 U. CHI.L.REV. 711, 712 (1986)). Butsee Ryan, supra note 6, at 648--49 
( disagreeing with Sax's further characterization ofcopyrightlaw as being " 'parsimonious in granting 
property rights' "). 
55 Michael A. Heller, The DynamicAna/ytics ofProperty Law, 2 THEORETICALINQUIRIES L. 79, 83 
(2001) (quoting WillIAMBLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2). 
56 See id. (citing ROBERT W. GORDON, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS 
OF PROPERTY 96 Q'ohn Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1996) (discussing restrictions recognized by 
Blackstone)). 
57 See id. ("While the image of sole dominion has never adequately described any real world 
property ownership, as even Blackstone recognized, the idea rings through the ages and continues 
to block clear thinking about private property." (footnote omitted)). Although Heller's analysis is 
in the context of tangible property, an analogy to intangible property would appear to be fitting. 
58 SINGER, supra note 12, at 90. Singer insightfully describes and analyzes these conventional 
property conceptions in this book, and his arguments are set forth in this Part of the Article. 
59 Id.; see also LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 40 (2003) ("The core idea of 
property, under this [common] conception, is property as a 'bounded sphere' which represents and 
protects an area of individual autonomy. Once triggered, the idea of autonomy is---,--by its 'very 
nature-absolute. Indeed, the very notion of rights being granted vru.-ying degrees of protection is 
intuitively inconsistent with the idea that those rights exist within a bounded sphere of individual 
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"underlying premise is that [an owner]" is by and large free "to use [its] property 
as [it] wish[es] ."60 Accordingly, such absolute conceptions ofproperty "advance[] 
a clear case for the supremacy of individual interests by defining property to be 
that which describes and protects the individual's autonomous sphere."61 
Consequently, the central question in most tangible property disputes becomes 
"Who is the owner?"62 In attempting to resolve this issue, "unconscious 
presumptions about who" should be deemed the owner often come into play, and 
not surprisingly, these presumptions "tend to come from conventional ',. 
understandings ofownership."63 Furthermore, once an entity has been designated ~ ; 
the "owner," all other claims generally become irrelevant.64 As a result, almost 
insurmountable obstacles are faced by any other party whose rights are affected. 65 
"The burden is [almost] always on [other parties] to explain why the [previously 
identified] owner's rights should be limited ...."66 Accordingly, the ability to 
justify the redistribution of any attendant rights of ownership becomes 
exceptionally difficult, if not impossible. 
Traditional conceptions of tangible property ownership unfortunately fail to 
fully account for the inherent complexities associated with determining 
ownership. It is imperative that we avoid "adjudicat[ing] property dispute[s] by 
[simply] making a rule that the owner wins."67 Merely holding that the owner is 
the one who should prevail "is circular because the meaning of ownership" is 
what actually is at issue.68 
The customary ownership inquiry in tangible property controversies is often 
far too narrow, as it generally neglects to make allowances for the existence of 
multiple owners or nonowners with interests that should take precedence over the 
autonomy and individual control."). 
60 SINGER, supra note 12, at 27. 
61 Laura Underkuffler, On Proper()': An Emry, 100 YALELJ. 127, 141 (1990). 
62 See SINGER, supra note 12, at 189. 
63 Id at 10. 
64 Id. at 189. 
65 See id at 83 ("We should recognize that property concepts perform a number of i;hetorical 
functions. First, by identifying a particular person as the owner, we commonly presume that that 
person wins disputes about the property. As we analyze choices among alternative property law 
rules, it is important to be sensitive to the persistent influence of the ownership concept in the 
assignment of the burden of persuasion."). 
66 Id. at 3 (''When ownership rights are limited, we imagine those limits to be exceptions to the 
general rule that owners can do whatever they want with their property. The burden is always on 
others (meaning nonowners or the state) to explain why the owner's rights should be limited, and 
in today's political climate that burden is quite heavy."). 
67 Id. at 114-15. 
68 Id. (questioning whether or not there could be "two owner~ here, with property rights divided 
between the parties, as they are in the case of landlords and tenants"). 
---------------------------
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one who may be traditionally thought of as having the superior property claim. 69 
Oftentimes the entity which has been designated the "owner" may not be "the 
one who, in all justice and fairness should have formal title or [all] the stick[s] in 
the bundle of rights encompassed by full ownership."70 
Moreover, the conventional view of tangible property ownership severely 
underestimates the degree "to which the exercise of property rights affects the 
legitimate interests of other owners and non-owners" beyond the sphere of the 
individual or entity traditionally thought of as the property owner.71 The 
recognition of property rights does not concern the identified owner alone but 
often imposes vulnerabilities on others by limiting their rights.72 It is therefore 
"irrational to define the extent of [one party's] property rights without reference 
to whether their exercise impinges on the rights of others," as the granting of 
property rights clearly has consequences. 73 Limitations on property rights are 
therefore sometimes necessary to safeguard the legitimate claims ofother possible 
owners ot nonowners with compelling needs. 
Likewise, restrictions on tangible property rights are at times required to 
protect important societal interests.74 As one court aptly stated, "[p]roperty rights 
serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it."75 
The resolution of tangible property disputes therefore calls for "the exercise of 
judgment and the application of social norms."76 It is imperative that we not 
overlook the fact that the ideals we choose to promote are revealed in the way in 
which these conflicts are resolved.77 
69 Id. at 91 ("'We presume that only one person has title to a piece of property, while several 
people may have entitlements of various kinds in that property."); see also Ryan, supra note 6, 
at 706-07 (arguing that decisions in copyright cases undITTalue the public's property interests in 
information for the sake of minority interests and industries). 
70 SINGER, supra note 12, at 114. , 
71 Id. at 173; see also Underkuffler, supra note 61, at 141 ("The absolute conception, however, 
advances a clear case for the supremacy ofindividual interests by defining property to be that which 
describes and protects the individual's autonomous sphere."). 
72 SINGER, supra note 20, at 20. 
73 SINGER, supra note 12, at 173. 
74 Id. at 31. 
75 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
76 SINGER, supra note 12, at 37. . 
77 Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 1046; see also MUNZER, supra note 20, at 149; PURDY, 
supra note 20, at 131; SINGER, supra note 20, at 25 ("[P]roperty is a social institution and [the] law 
regarding the perogatives of owners has significant effects on the shape and character of social 
relationships and the life of the community. The establishment ofa property system affects human 
relationships. It is imperative that the law of property take into account the effect of alternative 
constructions of property rights on those relationships."); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLa1v: A Ge11era/Restate1J1e11t, 148 U.,P A. L. REV. 1503, 1564 (2000) ("[T]he 
underlying values that the law seeks to protect, in both constitutional law and elsewhere, require for 
16 ]. INTEIL. PROP. L. [Vol. 15:1 
B. CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY IN THE INTANGIBLE 
WORLD 
The present method by 'which we evaluate data-related disputes and craft 
information rights policies grossly undervalues the public domain.78 Judges 
resolving controversies and lawmakers promulgating·legislation have failed to 
adequately take into account the multidimensional problems involved in claims 
concerning access to ideas and information. Instead, adjudicators and legislators 
have taken a remarkably myopic view of information rights policy, one that is 
heavily influenced by traditional tangible property conceptions. The 
complications associated with such tangible theories unfortunately become even 
more amplified in the intangible property context. 
As with controversies concerning tangible property, the initial focus 
commonly turns to the issue of ownership. While the general notion of private 
property rights in connection with real or personal property is not inherently 
problematic, the situation with regard to knowledge resources is quite different. 
Not only is copyright law implicated,79 but questions regarding free speech are 
raised as well.8°Furthermore, concerns relating to self-government and societal 
advancement also invariably emerge. The recognition ofprivate property rights 
in any sort of information, whether granting such rights directly or indirectly by 
providing the legal means by which complete control can be effectuated, presents 
significant policy issues. 81 
Nonetheless, the various competing interests in disputes concerning 
knowledge resources are not ordinarily considered. Judges and lawmakers often 
appear to have as their main objective the identification ofa solitary private owner 
of every knowledge resource.82 In doing so, these decisionmakers generally take 
a very narrow view of ownership. 
their protection that actions be taken in ways that express respect for those values."); iefra Part V 
( discussing such issues in the context of intangible property). 
78 Boyle, supra note 52, at 112-13. 
79 See supra Part IL 
80 Litman, supra note 49, at 1294-95; see also Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds ifDatabase 
Protection: The Role ef judicial Revie1v in the Creation and Definition of Private Rzghts in Iefo17nation, 
15 BERKELEYTECH.LJ. 535 (2000). 
81 Litman, supra note 49, at 1294-95. 
82 See Lemley, S11pra note 17, at 532-33; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 26. Although Singer's 
argument is not made in the context ofinformation or intellectual property, his remarks with regard 
to recent trends in both politics and law concerning property generally are particularly relevant: "In 
thinking about property, our organizing concept is oivnership. We want to identify a person or entity 
as the owner of every resource, and our assumption is that the !'.)wner has a full bundle of powers 
over the property and that those powers are close to absolute." Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Adjudicators and policy makers have demonstrated a marked proclivity toward 
inappropriately focusing on the proprietary rights to any readily identifiable 
tangible property that may be implicated in the controversy. This tangible 
· property may include, for example, a computer system or a website server.83 To 
the .extent no comparable tangible property is involved, the content producer of 
intangible information contained within tangible property, such as computer 
software, is generally viewed as having the dominant claim. This predilection may 
be attributable to a perception that the content producer is the "original owner" 
of the tangible property or similarly may be explained by an intrinsic belief that 
the putative author of such works should be deemed the "true owner."84 
'the significance of this initial determination of ownership should not be 
overlooked. The party who starts out holding the rights generally ends up 
retaining the rights. 85 As a result, the application of the label "owner" radically 
impacts any further decisions about the property at issue. 86 Just as in the tangible 
property context, the end result in most controversies becomes rather predictable. 
This is due to the fact that the traditional method of property analysis places 
considerable impediments before the party perceived as lacking any preliminary 
ownership interests. 87 Consequently, reallocation ofsuch ownership rights is for 
all practical purposes highly unlikely. 
Furthermore, the rights granted are generally quite broad. Typically included 
within such powers ofprivate property ownership in the tangible property context 
is the right to exclude.88 In fact, the right to exclude is often characterized as the 
83 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
84 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual PropertJI and the 
Public Domain--Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (1993) ("[I]here has been a recent and 
unfortunate tendency to reconceive of these items in ways which remove them from the intellectual 
'common.' These materials are transmuted into 'private' intellectual property, justified in part by our 
unquestioning valorization of a particular kind of creative human agency, whether through 
authorship, inventorship or the use of a trademark"); see also Boyle, supra note 52, at 106 ("[I]he 
'original author' vision downplays the importance offair use and thus encourages an absolutist rather 
than a functional idea of intellectual property."). 
85 See Clarisa Long, Propnetary PJghts and W& InitialA/locations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823 (2000) 
(discussing the issue of determining rights in the context of patent licensing); see also SINGER, supra 
note 12, at 3 (discussing the topic ofinitial allocations of property rights in the context of property 
theory generally). Singer states that "[t]he burden is always on others (meaning nonowners or the 
state) to explain why.the owner's rights should be limited, and in today's political climate that burden 
is quite heavy." Id. (citing Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The We!fare State and Theories of 
Distn'butive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 877 (1976) ("In questions ofethics and public policy as in 
questions of law, it is always important--and surprisingly often determinative-which way the 
presumption lies, who has the burden of proof.")). 
86 See supra note 65. 
87 SINGER, supra note 12, at 3. 
88 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also SINGER, supra note 12, 
II 
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defining attribute of private property. 89 As the Supreme Court stated in Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the "power to exclude has traditionally 
been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of 
property rights."90 Nevertheless, in the. tangible property context, this 
fundamental right is not entirely absolute.91 For example, "once an owner opens 
her property to the public for business purposes, the law requires the property to 
remain for the public uses to which she has dedicated it."92 In such 
circumstances, the right of access takes precedence over the right to exclude.93 
However, in the intangible context, the right to exclude is typically not 
similarly qualified. Instead, once an "owner" is identified, full support is normally 
given to any sort of contractual94 or technological95 restraint the newly 
at 40; Colin Crawford, (ybe,place: Defining a Right to Intemet Access Through Public Acco"'1110datio11 La1v, 
76 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 249 (2003) ("[1Jhe right to hold property can be conceptualized as a 'bundle 
of sticks' of which the 'biggest stick' in the bundle is the right to exclude."); Michael A. Heller, The 
Boundaries ifPrivate Property, 108 YALE LJ. 1163, 1212 (1999) (discussing Kaiser Aetna case). 
I' 
89 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclt1de, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 753 (1998) 
. l ("[1Jo the extent one has the right to exclude, then one has property; conversely, to the extent one 
does not have exclusion rights, one does not have property."). B11t see Heller, supra note 88, at 1212 
("[KaiserAetna] is often cited for the proposition that 'the "right to exclude," so universally held to 
be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation.' This is an odd statement, relying on questionable 
authority. . . . Private property undeniably exists when some of the standard incidents are missing, 
even the 'right to exclude.' (citations omitted)). 
90 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
91 S.ee, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisted: PoliticalActivity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
633, 667 (1991) ("The owner of real property has never enjoyed an absolute right to exclude 
strangers or to regulate activity upon its premises. Instead, the common law historically has shaped 
and refined the network of relationships between landowners and those seeking entry to or already 
present upon the land."); Morton J. Horowitz, Conceptualizjng the RightefA;cess to Techno!O!!)', 79 WASH. 
L. REV. 105, 115 (2004) ("[E]ven the most absolute-sounding subject of trespass to land can be 
shown to be riddled with exceptions. From the Supreme Court's reluctance during the Civil Rights 
Era to enforce the trespass laws against civil rights demonstrators engaged in sit-ins at segregated 
private facilities to state courts entertaining the defense ofnecessity put forth by activists protesting 
against the dangers from nuclear power facilities, we see the malleability of property rights when 
defenses of necessity or of an implied public easement are used to limit the absolutist sound of 
trespass.''). 
92 SINGER, supra note 12, at 44. 

93 Id. 

94 See infra Part III.B.3 Qughlighting the various types of contractual methods often utilized, 
including contracts in the form of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, or browsewrap licenses). 
95 See infra Part III.B.2 (noting the increasing use of digital rights management systems by 
copyright proprietors). 
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acknowledged individual or entity has employed.96 This allows these "owners" to 
tightly control who or what97 may access and consequently use such works. 
As a result, "[c]ontrary to the spirit of asserted copyright philosophy, such 
[factual data] and 'unprotectable' attributes of creative works are left entirely to 
the.dominion ofthe owner, with no duty to make them accessible to the public."98 
The extent to which the purported owner's exercise of its rights, particularly the 
right to exclude, affects others is given short shrift, if it is even considered at all. 
Instead, anyone who wishes to ~tilize the ideas, data, or other material 
disseminated, for example, through an Internet site or by means of computer 
software faces· an exceptionally heavy burden of justification for limiting the 
website owner's or content producer's rights.99 
The model used by the adjudicators and legislators in such controversies . 
generally does not allow for any serious consideration to be given to the impact 
on the public domain. Although a thorough discussion of decisions and policies 
illustrating the increasing utilization of a nearly absolute conception of tangible 
property ownership and resultant propertization in the information context is 
beyond the scope of this Article, brief examination of a few representative 
examples is warranted. The successful utilization in the digital world of the 
common law claim of trespass, the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, and the enforcement of contracts that arguably reallocate rights granted by 
the Copyright Act demonstrate an inadequate appreciation of the 
multidimensional nature of these controversies and the attendant effects on the 
public domain. 
1. Online Trespass. Modern Internet cases have given the venerable doctrine. 
of trespass new life. Judges have not only treated cyberspace as though it were 
virtually equivalent to .a place in the physical world, but seem to believe that all of 
its constituent parts must be privately owned by someone or something that has 
total control over the property.100 In analyzing controversies involving a party 
seeking to access computer technology and the data contained therein, the issue 
96 See infra Part III.B.2 (noting that to the extent the work in question contains copyrightable 
material, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides further assistanc.e to these "owners" seeking 
to control all access and utilization of any information at issue). 
97 See infra Part III.B.1 (describing how the court in eBqJ' denied access to software robots). 
98 Ryan, supra note 6, at 670. 
99 See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 11, 169-71 (articulating the arguments on both sides of the eBqJJ 
case); Morton]. Horwitz, Co11ceptualizj11g the Right ofAccess to TechnologJ, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105, 116 
(2004); Dan Hunter, yiberspace as Place and the Tragecfy ofthe Digita/Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 
508 (2003). 
100 See Lemley, supra note 17, at 532-33. 
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is generally framed analogously to real property, with its fairly well delineated 
boundaries.101 However, things usually are not so clear in cyberspace. 
Illustrative of this proclivity toward privatization and adoption of a tangible 
model of property ownership in the information resources context is eBqy, Inc. v. 
Bidder's Edge, Inc. 102 In that case, eBay brought suit against Bidder's Edge for using 
an electronic software robot103 to access and gather factual data contained on 
eBay' s publicly accessible Internet site.104 eBay's computer system had not been 
harmed in any way by Bidder's Edge's robotic activity. 105 There was no evidence 
that eBay had suffered any loss of data or that it had experienced any system 
crashes or slowdowns.106 Nonetheless, the court granted a preliminary injunction 
against Bidder's Edge on a trespass claim on the grounds that Bidder's Edge had 
intentionally interfered with eBay's possessory interest in the computer system.107 
In so doing, the court ruled that eBay had a "fundamental property right to 
exclude others from its computer system ...."108 
101 See Horwitz, supra note 99, at 116 ("It appears that whenever a court analyzes a denial of 
access to computer technology in terms of trespass, by framing the issue as analogous to real 
property containing more or less clearly defined boundaries, the court is already predisposed to 
adopt a mental picture ofboundary-crossing defendants who are prima fade guilty of trespass onto 
plaintiffs fee simple."). 
102 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see.also Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, 
Inc., No. C-00-0724, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (deciding not to dismiss plaintiffs claim 
oftrespass to chattels where defendant allegedly used a software robot to copy meta tag information); 
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that 
sending unsolicited bulk email constituted trespass to chattels); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 
F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), ajfd as modified, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding district 
court's issuance of a preliminary injunction on a trespass to chattels theory). · 
103 A software robot is a computer program that can perform tasks on the Internet without 
human supervision. Some ofthe more typical functions include compiling results for search engines, 
filtering for inappropriate content, or obt_aining information made publicly accessible on the web 
sites of others. Software robots are capable of executing these tasks at speeds far in excess ofwhat 
a human can accomplish. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 
2001); eB,v,, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61. 
104 eB,v,, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-63. 
105 Id. at 1064--65. 
106 Id. The court re.asoned that ifBidder's Edge's "activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it 
would encourage other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay 
system such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system 
unavailability, or data losses." Id. at 1066. Therefore, based on the mere possibility of future harm 
by unidentified third parties, the court enjoined Bidder's Edge's robots from crawling eBay's publicly 
accessible website. Id. at 1069, 1073. 
101 Id. at 1069-70. 
108 Id. at 1067. 
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In cases like eBqy, courts appear to be predisposed to designate the publicly 
accessible website operator as the one true "owner."109 Once such a label is 
applied, the end result in most disputes is predetermined.110 This is due to the 
fact that the party seeking to use information is viewed as a border-crossing 
defendant who is prima fade guilty.111 But particularly in the case. of data 
published on a publicly available website, why should control over access to the 
facts and ideas be treated as part of the website owner's exclusive domain?112 By 
choosing to post the uncopyrightable data to an Internet site that can be viewed 
by virtually anyone with an Internet connection, the purported owner has already 
opened its "land" to the general public.113 As such, it should be expected that by 
doing so, the publicly accessible website operator relinquishes some of the 
autonomy owners of private property might traditionally enjoy.114 Furthermore, 
the public arguably has superior rights to the uncopyrightable information 
contained therein, even if it is not traditionally thought of as an owner.115 
Nonetheless, resorting to an absolute conception of tangible property rights fails 
to take into account that there can be more than one owner or non-owners with 
significant interests whose rights af times should take precedence. 
2. Digital Millennium Copyrighi Act. Increasingly, content producers have 
turned to technological measures, such as digital rights management systems 
(DRMs), to strictly regulate access to their works.116 This technology "can be 
109 See Horwitz, supra note 99, at 116 (discussing a case in which an ex~employee was denied 
access to the company's email server based on the court's analogies to real property theories). 
110 Jd 
m Id. 
112 See Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use ofthe Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to 
Co11trolinjom1ation 011 PublicfyAccessible Internet Websites, 63 MD.L.REv. 320, 361..:.63 (2001) (discussing 
the ability of website operators to control uncopyrightable information ·on publicly accessible 
websites); Litman, supra note 7, at 206 (discussing the consequences ofreducing the idea-expression 
distinction); Ryan, supra note 6, at 693 (discussing why substantial public access to copyrighted works 
is essential). 
113 See Curtis]. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: PoliticalActivity 011 Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
633, 652-57 (1991) (distinguishing between truly private places, such as the 'home, and public spaces, 
like shopping centers). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (declaring that 
property does not "lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it 
for designated purposes"). However, an argument can be made that the 4olding of this case should 
be narrowly construed. See Galbraith, supra note 112, at 364-65. 
114 Galbraith, supra note 112, at 362; see also Berger, supra note 113, at 636 (discussing the 
relinquishment of autonomy in regards to real property made public). 
115 See infra Part III (addressing ownership of materials in the pu~lic domain). 
116 See generalfy Stefan Bechtold, Digital 'Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 323 (2004) (providing an overview ofDRM systems and the legal·framework surrounding 
them);Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on CopyrightManagement Systems andLa1vs Designed to Protect Them, 
12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 183 (1997) (discussing the restri~tion of digital information through 
: 
I 
I ___ 
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used to lock up information that should be freely accessible for public benefit 
pursuant to copyright law."117 Such efforts were bolstered in 1998 by the passage 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).118 The DMCA imposes 
liability for acts of circumvention and proscribes technologies that could be 
employed to defeat DRMs.119 
The DMCA theoretically attempts to strike a balance by providing that its 
provisions do not affect fair use.120 However, by prohibiting all acts of 
circumvention, as well as all the tools that can be used for such circumvention, 
"the DMCA [effectively] grants to copyright owners the power to unilaterally 
eliminate 1;he public's fair use rights."121 Furthermore, courts interpreting the 
DMCA have reinforced the copyright holder's ability to control access by ruling 
that fair use cannot be raised as a defense.122 
As a result, the DMCA essentially renders the Copyright Act's fair use 
provisions and other related limitations meaningless. This is due to the fact that 
even ifin principle the public still has the right to utilize such copyrighted works, 
the right becomes worthless ifit is impossible to access these materials in the first 
place. By adopting a virtually absolute conception of ownership, the DMCA 
''potentiallyallow[s] copyright owners control over every use ofdigital technology 
the use ofcopyright management systems); StephenM. Kramarsky, CopyrightE1ifbrcelllentin the Intemet 
Age: The La/Ii and TechnologJ' efDigital Rights Ma11ageme1it, 11 DEPAUL-LCA]. ART & ENT. L. & 
PoL'Y 1, 10 (2001) ( discussing encryption technology for DVDs); Edited & Excerpted Transcript efthe 
Symposiu111 on The Lan, & TechnologJ, efDigital Rights Manage111ent, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697, 736 
(2003) ( discussing congressional proposals thatwould strengthen protections for digital media rights 
holders). 
117 Ryan, supra note 6, at 670. 
118 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as 
amended in various sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
119 For further discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see Orin S. Kerr,A Luke1van11 
Defense ef the Digital Millennitm1 Copy1ight Act, in COPYFIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002); MattJackson, 
Using TechnologJ' to Circu111vent the La1v: The DMCA '.r Push to P1ivatize Copy1ight, 23 HASTINGS COJ\,fr,,f. 
& ENT. LJ. 607 (2001); Craig Allen Nard, The DMCA 's Anti-Device Provisions: Intpeding the Progress ef 
the Usefttl A1ts?, 8 WASH. U. J .L. & POL'Y 19 (2002); David Nimmer, App1·eciatzi1g Legislative History: 
The S1veet and Sour Spots ef the DMCA's Co11111m1taiy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002); Pamela 
Samuelson, Intellectual Proper(), and the Digital Eco11011ry: W'ID' the Anti-Circumvmtion Regulations Need to 
be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title."). 
121 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Yea1:r under the DMCA, available 
athttp:/ /www.eff.org/wp/unintended-consequences-seven-years-under-dmca Oast visited Nov. 4, 
2007). 
122 SeeLipton,s11pranote 16, at 761 (citing Universal Cit:y Studios,Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 
2d 321, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 01olding that the fair use defe1,1se cannot be raised in an action for 
trafficking in technology that circumvents a technological measure)). 
-------------------- ------------
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in connection with their protected works."123 Such a myopic view of property
rights unfortunately disregards the considerable harm to the public domain. 
3. Contracts. Recently, there has been an extraordinary proliferation of 
contracts utilized in connection with information resources. Content producers 
now frequently place contractual restrictions on access to and use of their works 
in an attempt to prevent all unauthorized and uncompensated applications oftheir 
works. Standard form contracts, often in the form of shrinkwrap,124 clickwrap,125 
or browsewrap 126 licenses are commonly employed. These "agreements"127 often 
contain harsh provisions that seek to prohibit actions that are clearly allowed 
under the Copyright Act, such as conduct that would undoubtedly qualify as fair_ 
use. Additionally, the use of facts and ideas contained in such materials is often 
heavily regulated, even though they constitute the building blocks of knowledge 
and are supposed to remain within the public domain. 128 Nonetheless, 
'·. ~! ' 
123 Ryan, sup1"tl note 6, at 673 (citing Litman, supra note 28, at 37). 
124 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A shrinl.-wrap 
license typically involves (1)- notice of a license agreement on product packaging (i.e., the 
shrinkwrap), (2) presentation of the full license on documents inside the package, and (3) prohibited 
access to the product without an express indication of acceptance. Generally, in the shrinl.-wrap 
context, the consumer does not manifest assent to the shrinh.-wrap terms at the time of purchase; 
instead, the consumer manifests assent to the terms by later actions."). 
125 See, e.g., id. at 429 ( defining a "clickwrap license" as onewhich "presents the potential licensee 
(i.1c., the end-user) with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest 
his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on an icon" (quoting Specht v. 
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))). 
126 See, e.g., Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 782 
n.14 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (defining a "browsewrap license" as a license that is "typically part of a web 
site-its terms may be posted on the site's home page or may otherwise be accessible via a 
hyperlink" and explaining that "[i)n contrast to clich.-wrap licenses, a user may download software 
0 
under a b rowsewrap license prior to manifesting assent to its terms"). 
127 The validity of these agreements has been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion. See 
generalb1 Benkler, st1pra note 4, at 354 ( discussing copyright law and the scope of the public domain); 
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Poli!]' and the Limits ofFreedom ofContract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ 93 
(1997) (arguing that courts should not enforce contracts that seek to expand copyright protection); 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Properry La111, 13 
BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 827 (1998) (exploring the relationship between contract and copyright law); 
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copy1ight Preemption After the ProCD Case: A -Market-Based Approach, 12 
BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 53 (1997) (discussing the competing interests involved in freedom ofcontract 
and preservation of the public domain); J .H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privatebi Legislated 
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom ofContract with Public Good Uses ofI11for111ation, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 87 5 (1999) ( examining the practice of contracting around federal intellectual property law). 
128 Litman, supmnote 7, at 187; Patty, supra note 5, at 368-69 ("Copying such material promotes 
the progress of science by keeping the basic building blocks of knowledge free for all to use....''); 
Ryan, supra note 6, at 661, 669-70; see also Lipton, supra note 1.6, at 695, 738; Litman, supra note 49, 
at 1283, 1294-95. 
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adjudicators have been quick to support these restraints despite the fact that they 
undeniably alter the delicate balance that the Copyright Act strikes. 
For example, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,129 the plaintiff was required to 
provide to the public an online, interactive database containing the names, 
addresses, and phone numbers of all customers who registered domain names 
through its services as part of its obligation as an accredited domain name 
registrar. 130 Because the data contained therein consisted solely of facts, the 
information was not protectable under copyright law.131 Normally, this would 
allow a party to freely copy, utilize, and distribute this data. 
However, Register.com published terms and conditions governing the use of 
its domain name registrant database on the home page of its publicly accessible 
Internet site.132 These provisions prohibited a party from using the contact 
information to engage in any commercial advertising or solicitations via direct 
mail, electronic mail, or telephone.133 Additionally, the terms provided that by 
submitting a request for information from the database, the user agreed to be 
bound by the terms and cqnditions of use.134 Verio conceded that its use of the 
contact information for marketing purposes conflicted withRegister.com's posted 
restrictions.135 However, Verio claimed that the terms and conditions were 
unenforceable.136 
The court disagreed, finding that Verio was in fact bound by the limitations 
posted by Register.com on its Internet site.137 The court ruled that since Verio 
had retrieved contact information \.vith an intent to engage in solicitation in 
violation of Register.corn's posted policies, Verio had breached the contract.138 
f:
l,, 
129 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), ajfd, 356 F.3d 393 (2004). 

130 Id. at 241-43. 

131 Id. at 241-42; see also supra Part II. 

132 126 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 

133 Id. at 242-43. The terms and conditions read as follows: 

By submitting a [query], you agree that you will use this data only for lawful 
purposes and that, under no circumstances will you use this data to: (1) allow, 
enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial 
advertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by telephone; or (2) 
enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Register.com 
(or its systems). The compilation, repackaging, dissemination or other use ofthis 
data is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Register.com, 
Register.com reserves the right to modify these terms at any time. By submitting 
this query, you agree to abide by these terms. 
Id. 
134 Id. 

135 
 Id. at 245. 

136 Id. at 246. 

137 Id. at 248. 

138 Id. at 245-48. 
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The court held that even if Verio's initial access to the contact information 
database could be classified as "authorized," such access would still be rendered 
"unauthorized" by virtue of the fact that prior to entry Verio knew that the data 
it obtained would be used later for a purpose prohibited by the terms and 
conditions of Register.corn's Internet site.139 Therefore, the court found that 
Register.com was entitled to a preliminary injunction based upon its breach of 
contract claim and ordered Verio to comply with all of Register.com' s website 
policies.140 . 
As is characteristic in controversies of this type, the district court in the 
Register.com case never discussed the fact that the. information at issue was 
uncopyrightable or that it had been made publicly available by Register.cC>m. 
Instead, Register.com was essentially considered the owner of the information 
and as such was entitled to completely supplant the carefully balanced provisions 
of the Copyright Act with its own privately legislated intellectual property laws.141 
The utilization of traditional conceptualizations of ownership generally leads to 
wholesale enforcement of restrictions on access to and use of data-related 
resources. This failure to reconcile the varying interests at stake in disputes ofthis 
nature seriously discounts the considerable consequences to the public domain 
specifically and society generally. 
C. OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The private ownership of information is arguably even more problematic 
when we begin to consider a somewhat unconventional conceptualization of the 
public domain. The public domain is typically characterized as consisting of 
material not subject to any intellectual property protection.142 Nonetheless, a 
strong argument can be made that the public domain is not defined by a complete 
absence of ownership, but rather a more appropriate conceptualization is one in 
which the materials contained therein are actually owned by the public.143 
Historically, the term "public domain" was used synonymously with the 
phrases "public property" and "common property."144 These expressions call to 
mind a much different rhetorical image, namely one in which "the entire public 
1 
I 
' 
) 
I. 
139 Id. at 253. 

140 Id. at 252-53. 

141 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Draiving Borders i~ a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. 

REV. 609 (1998); Elkin-Koren, supra note 127. . 
142 Ochoa, supra note 4, at 215, 256; see also James Boyle, Fore1vord.· The Opposite ofProperty?, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2003, at 30 (2003); Litman, supra note 4, at 1010-11. 
143 See Ochoa, supra note 4, at 256. 
144 Id. at 257. 
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owns a property interest in the public domain."145 As one commentator explains, 
the adjective "public" or "common" does not signify a lack of ownership but 
instead simply eliminates the "exclusive" nature of such ownership.146 Similarly, 
this reasoning would appear to apply to the term "public domain" as well. 147 In 
fact, the word "domain" has been defined as "[t]he complete and absolute 
ownership ofland."148 Consequently, the phrase "public domain" would seem to 
imply that "the public has an [affirmative] ownership interest in the material" at 
issue.149 
Furthermore, a number ofrecent intellectual property cases also lend support 
to the position that "the public domain is owned by everyone, rather than by no 
one."15° For example, in Tastefulfy Simple, Inc. ?J. Two Sisters Gourmet, the Sixth 
Circuit stated "a document or publication that is in the public domain is one that 
is owned by the public and thus not subject to copyright protection."151 Similarly, 
in Comecfy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema, the Ninth Circuit, in discussing 
whether the plaintiff could raise a copyright claim, held that "Comedy III could 
not do so even ifit wanted to because any copyright has long expired and the film 
at issue is in the public domain. We all own it now."152 
Regardless, however, ofwhether we view the public as owning the material in 
the public domain, or as simply having an important non-owner interest in its 
protection and continued growth, we need a better method of analysis to make 
certain that such claims are taken into account in disputes involving access to and 
the use ofinformation. Rights related to the control ofknowledge resources "are 
expanding by the moment, unchecked by public scrutiny of sophisticated 
analysis."153 It is therefore imperative in evaluating controversies and 
145 Id. 
14r. Id. 
141 Id 
148 Id (citingBLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 385 (1st ed. West 1891) ( defining demesne as "domain" 
or "held in one's own right")). 
149 Id. at 257, 259. 
150 Id at 260. 
151 134 F. App'x 1, 5 (6th Cir. 2005). 
152 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring 
Servs. of Am., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated 011 other grounds ("This quid pro quo 
reflects a fundamental fairness to both the public, the 'owner' of the public domain, and the author 
who takes from the public domain the ideas which are the substance of such aut:):J.or's protected 
original expression."); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) ("In this case, the fact that Mayer permitted her design to enter the public domain is fatal to 
any claim she can assert. ... !I]tis elementary that once copyrightable material is publishecl without 
the author's first securing federal copyright protection, the author loses his property interest in the 
material. The material becomes public property. In this case, Mayer no longer owned her design. 
The public did." ( citations omitted)). 
153 Boyle, supra note 52, at 115. 
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promulgating polices concerning knowledge resources that we adopt an analytical 
framework which ensures the decisionmaking process reveals the true costs 
involved.154 
IV. ENTITLEMENT APPROACH 
Leading tangible property theorist Joseph Singer has advocated the use of an 
alternative construction ofproperty for defining and allocating property rights. 155 
This model, which he refers to as an "entitlement approach," shifts the focus 
from merely determining the owner to identifying the interests ofall ofthe parties 
with legitimate claims to rights in the particular resource at issue.156 An 
"entitlement" in contemporary legal discourse is usually defined as encompassing 
"any legal right or protected interest."157 
According to Singer, "property is best understood as comprising limited and 
conflicting entitlements rather than absolute powers in title holders."158 Several 
individuals may have "entitlements of various kinds" in a particular piece of 
property.159 "Although entitlements are strongly protected legal rights, they are 
nonetheless subject to limitations to protect the entitlements of others."160 
Entitlements therefore go both ways in the sense that they entitle as well as 
154 Id. at 110. 
155 See SINGER, supra note 12. Other leading tangible property theorists have also recommended 
a more broad-based method for analyzing property disputes. In particular, Laura Underkuffler has 
analyzed the numerous deficiencies of an absolute approach to property and has highlighted the 
necessity of utilizing a somewhat related method of. conceptualizing property rights. See 
Underh.'llffler, supra note 61, at 127; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 1033. Underkuffler 
argues that property has historically been viewed as "something that is objectively definable or 
identifiable, apart from social context, and that it represents and protects the sphere of legitimate, 
absolute individual autonomy." Underkuffler, supra note 61, at 133. However, "property rights, like 
all individual rights, are rarely absolute in any society." Id. Therefore, she advocates _for the use of 
a "comprehensive approach" that explicitly acknowledges the tensions between the interests of the 
individual and the collective of which tl1e individual is a part. Id. at 129. Underkuffler further 
explores many of these issues in much more detail in her groundbreaking book, THE IDEA OF 
PROPER1Y: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003). 
156 SINGER, supra note 12, at 91. 
157 Id.; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property &ties, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One VieJIJ of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (providing integrative 
framework for analyzing entitlementissues and applying framework to p9llution problem); Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliabili!)• Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002) (extending Calabresi­
Melamed framework to pliable rules). 
158 SINGER, supra note 12, at 209. 

159 Id. at 91-92. 

160 Id. 

28 ]. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 15:1 
obligate.161 As such, property claims are not only assertions of entitlement, "but 
claims that it is fair to impose obligations on others to. respect those 
entitlements."162 Thus under the entitlement model, the predominant concern 
becomes the relationships between the parties, "including the effects of each 
party's exercise ofits entitlement on others."163 This approach suggests a thinner 
bundle of rights than full absolute ownership assumes, and as a result, provides 
a more accurate assessment of contextually defined property rights. 164 
Additionally, this type of analytical framework would force judges and 
lawmakers to alter their image of the relationships between individual right 
holders and the society ofwhich they are a part165 This is due to the fact that in 
order to choose between conflicting interests, controversial value judgments will 
have to be made.166 Furthermore, the way in which such property rights are 
defined reveals a great deal about the values society finds important.167 The goals 
and ideals to be served by property rights and the property system must be 
determined in order to decide what kind of policies to promulgate or which 
property interests should prevail in any given dispute.168 These rights, although 
individual in nature, must therefore be understood and informed not only by what 
kind of society we have, but more importantly by the type of society that we wish 
to become.169 
161 Id. at 210. 
162 Id. at 211. 
163 Id. at 94. 
164 Id. at 91. 
165 Underkuffler, suprahote 61, at 129; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 106 ("I will argue for a 
new nonnative framework that considers the role that property law plays in shaping the contours 
of social relationships. This relational approach will broaden the considerations relevant to law 
making and will better allow us both to express and to critically analyze our deepest values and 
commitments."). 
166 SINGER, strpra note 12, at 7. 
167 See MUNZER, supra note 20, at 149 (further citing works that draw on Hegel); see also 
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 59, at 54 ("Property is, under af!Y conception, quintessentially and 
absolutely a social institution. Every conception of property reflects, through its constituent 
dimensions, those choices thatwe-as a society-have made." (emphasis in original)); Underkuffler­
Freund, supra note 20, at 146. 
168 SINGER, supra note 12, at 37; see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 77, at 1503, 1564; Ryan, 
supra note 6, at 651 ("[I] tis important to identify the values we are promoting when resolving current 
issues regarding information as property."). 
169 Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 1033, 1045; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 146 
(''Because they shape the contours ofrelationships, property rules should be conceptualized not only 
as protecting individual rights (moral claims ofindividuals) but also as establishing property systems. 
Property systems form the overall social context in which individuals live."); Dan Hunter, Cjberspace 
as Place and the Tragecfy of the Digital Anticommo11s, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 518 (2003) ("The kind of 
property that we have determines much of the society that we will have; therefore the social life that 
we want should determine the type ofproperty that we allow."). 
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Such an approach therefore provides an enhanced analytical structure for 
. developing policies and deciding cases that more readily ensures the concerns of 
all relevant parties are taken into account.170 · It requires lawmakers and 
adjudicators to explicitly face all ofthe issues involved in any,property dispute and 
necessitates tl1e exercise of judgment to adequately balance the various interests 
that exist.171 Although it requires that difficult questions be answered when 
presented with such conflicts, "[t]he law of property already addresses them by 
default, if not otherwise. The only question is whether they should be decided 
with or without explicit examination."172 
170 As Singer explains, the entitlement approach is quite unlike other solutions that have been 
proposed to combat the problems inherent in an absolutist conception of property. These other 
strategies tend to fall within three general categories: · 
One approach is to argue for regulation ofproperty in the public interest. This 
strategy accepts the core image ofproperty as ownership but defends limitations 
on property rights to promote interests such as a fair distribution of wealth, 
prevention of environmental harms, or protection from unequal' bargaining 
power. A second strategy, adopted by the legal realists in the first half of the 
twentieth century, is to conceptualize property as a bundle of distinct 
entitlements and then to ignore the property concept as outdated. This approach 
.does not get rid. of ownership as a concept; it merely asks us .to talk about 
ownership ofparticular entitlements rather than ownership of the entire bundle. 
Although it helps in disentangling the ownership bundle, it does not free us from 
its sway, and it does nothing to alter the conscious or unconscious burdens of 
persuasion comprised by the traditional ownership concept. 
A third strategy, championed by Margaret Jane Radin, distinguishes between 
types ofproperty that are legitimately commodified and those that should not be 
commodified at all, such as body parts, or which should be only incompletely 
commodified, such as the family home .... 
These critical approaches to property limit the effect of the traditional model 
either by identifying limits to ownership rights or by referring to alternative 
conceptions of property that may compete with the commodity concept .... 
They are compatible with the social relations model I have developed here. 
There are, however, two major shifts in emphasis in my approach. 
First, rather than understanding these tensions as external to the traditional 
model of property, I see them as contained 1Pithin the traditional model. . . . 
Second, rather than focusing on different types of property (personal versus 
fungible), limiting the realm ofcommodification, or accepting a role for property 
in establishing the just social order, I have focused on the quality, character, and 
diversity of social relations. 
SINGER, supra note 12, at 207-08 (emphasis in original). 
171 See id. at 91 ("When we adopt this new model, our focus shifts from identifying the owner to 
identifying the conflicting interests of everyone with legitimate claims to rights in the property in 
question."); Underkuffler, supra note 61, at 127, 142. 
172 Underkuffler, supra note 61, at 146; sec also SINGER, supra note 12, at 95 (" 'Ifwe approach 
property rights as one of the most important vehicles for ,structuring relations of power in our 
society and as a means of expressing the relations of responsibility we want to encourage, we will 
i 
l 
I, 
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I 
j: V. PANOPTIC APPROACH 
The panoptic approach begins by rejecting the absolute conception oftangible 
property that judges and lawmakers generally resort to in disputes affecting the 
public domain. In moving away from such a traditional view ofproperty rights, 
the proposed model creates a more appropriate heuristic from which 
controversies involving knowledge resources can be reviewed and decided. The 
panoptic approach takes account ofthe fact that information property ownership · 
has significant social consequences.173 As a result, the proposed model more 
accurately portrays the true impact from private control ofinformation resources. 
The foundation of the panoptic approach is significantly influenced by the 
alternative construction of tangible property set forth in the entitlement model. 
However, before discussing the various contours of the panoptic approach, it is 
worth examining the congruity of drawing upon a tangible theory of property. 
While the indiscriminate use of such theories in connection with data-related 
disputes is problematic, a complete prohibition seems equally improvident. 
. ADDRESSING THE LIMITATIONS OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY ANALOGIES 
Recently, much has been written about the appropriateness of applying 
tangible property theories to controversies concerning intangible resources.174 In 
the opinion of many acaqemic writers, the failure to account for the significant 
distinctions between the two has led to inappropriate judicial decisions and the 
promulgation of legislation that is objectionable on the grounds of public 
olicy.175 For example, information is unlike land or tangible goods in the sense 
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start off the debate in a useful way.''') (quoting Jennifer Nedelsy, &conceiving Rights as Relationships, 
1 REV. CONST. STUD,/REVUEE'ETUDES CONSTITUTIONNEllES 1, 16 (1993)). 
173 See Lipton, supra note 15, at 173-74; see also Balkin, supra note 47, at 53 (noting that 
"ri]ntellectual property rights exist to promote the spread of culture and possibilities for cultural 
innovation and transformation"). 
174 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 95 ("The system of control that we erect for rivalrous 
resources Oand, cars, computers) is notnecessarib' appropriate for nonrivalrous resources (ideas, music, 
expression). Indeed, the same ,!)!Stemfor both kinds efresources fllf!J' do real hamt. Thus a legal system, or 
a society generally, must be careful to tailor the kind of control to the kind of resource. One size 
won't fit all." (emphasis added)). 
· 
175 See, e.g., id. at 237 (''By simplifying the nature of the rights that IP law protects, by speaking 
of it as property, just like the ordinary property of cars and homes, thinking is guided in a very 
particular way. When it is viewed as property, we see endless arguments for strengthening IP and 
few for resisting that increase."); Hunter, supra note 169, at 499-500 (arguing that use of a real 
property metaphor "is leading us inexorably towards an undesirable policy outcome: the staking out 
ofprivate claims in cyberspace and concomitant reductions jn the public 'ownership' of the space"); 
Lemley, supra note 17, at 522 ("[R]eliance on the cyberspace as place metaphor is leading courts to 
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that it is non-rivalrous. In other words, mul:tiple individuals can utilize the same 
data without interfering with one another.176 Furthermore, the cost ofproviding 
information generally does not increase with consumption, unlike tangible 
property.111 
This predilection for resorting to tangible property metaphors has been · 
especially pervasive in connection with cyberspace-related disputes where 
adjudicators and policy makers often apply real property theories. Many academic 
commentators have cautioned that by conceptualizing the Internet as if it were a 
physical space, judges and lawmakers frequently disregard the significant 
differences between tangible and intangible resources, which results in an 
increased tendency toward propertization in cyberspace.178 Nonetheless, as other 
writers have pointed out, utilizing a tangible property metaphor is not entirely 
problematic.179 Oftentimes it can be helpful to utilize familiar concepts to 
contend with novel issues.18°Furthermore, particularly in the cyberspace context, 
it is unlikely that judges and legislators will adopt a cognitive metaphor that is not 
physical as this method of analysis has now become so entrenched in our legal 
vernacular:181 
results that are nothing short of disastrous as a matter of public policy."); Carol M. Rose, The Several 
Fut11res ofProperty: OfCyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Eco.[Jsfems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 
153 (1998) ("The normal rationing function of property and pricing would be out ofplace [ on the 
Internet], because ideas are not scarce goods in the same sense as, say, coffee beans. Intellectual 
activities are rather goods whose number and value is enhanced with more entry, more use; if 
particular innovations are walled off and payment is required for access, the sum ofinnovation will 
decline."). 
176 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 58-59 ("[I]nformation is natural nonrivalrous. . . . In 
Jefferson's poetry, '[H]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himselfwithoutlessening 
mine; as he who lites his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.'"). 
177 See, e.g., Lipton, s11pra note 15, at 14~1 ("[I]nformation cannot be property in the same sense 
that land and other tangible items can be property. This limitation follows because information is 
a 'public good'; that is, 'the cost of providing the good does not increase with consumption, 
and ... it is generally infeasible to exclude others from consuming the good.' " ( citations omitted)). 
178 See supra note 172. 
179 See, e.g., Lipton, s11pra note 15, at 142 (" 'Property' terminology need not be avoided, provided 
that we are clear about what is meant when the term is used in the context of information. There 
may, in fact, be some distinct advantages in utilizing the term.''); Lipton, supra note 16, at 711 (stating 
that familiar terminology may be helpful); Alfred C. Yen, Westem Frontier orFeudalSociety?: Metaphors 
andPerceptions ofCyberspace, 17 BERKELEYTECH.L.J. 1207, 1209, 1214 (2002) (arguing that developing 
a balanced set of metaphors is a productive way to study an innovation like the Internet). 
180 Lipton, s11pra note 16, at 719 ("The use of familiar 'property' and 'privacy' terminology should 
also not be objectionable for the reasons set out in the Introduction. These terms may, in fact, be 
more useful and helpful organizing tools for a new field oflaw and policy than would the creation 
of wholly novel concepts in this context."). 
181 See Hunter, supra note 169, at 516 (stating that the undi::rstanding of cyberspace as a physical 
place has become c~ntral to our discussion of this topic). 
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The key, therefore, is not necessarily avoiding analogies to tangible property 
altogether. Instead, the use of simplistic, absolute conceptions of property that 
underestimate the true consequences of such decisions must be abandoned. In 
their place, a theoretical framework that requires decisionmakers to adequately 
assess all of.the relevant issues and interests should be substituted. 
B. DELINEATING A MORE APPROPRIATE BASELINE 
In formulating policies and adjudicating conflicts that involve information, it 
is imperative that we acknowledge the complexity of these controversies. The 
panoptic approach therefore begins by shifting th~ inquiry away from determining 
a solitary, absolute owner. Instead, the focus of the panoptic approach initially 
turns to recognizing all of the various ownership and societal interests involved 
in any dispute that concerns data-related materials. 
This would first include the identification of any individual or entity with 
legitimate claims to the knowledge resource itself or the means by which access 
to and use of the information may be effectuated. However, the inquiry is not 
limited merely to recognizing content producers or other parties customarily 
thought ofas having ownership rights. The panoptic approach would also require 
that non-owners who would be considerably impacted by a decision concerning 
the materials in question be taken into account. 
Such a model therefore acknowledges that there are often parties other than 
a plaintiff or defendant in a given data-related dispute that would be significantly 
affected by the outcome. Similarly, the panoptic approach would compel policy 
makers to carefully identify parties beyond just those lobbying in support of or 
in opposition to a particular piece of legislation. In most circumstances, this 
would require judges and lawmakers to recognize that at minimum the public has 
a strong interest in controversies affecting the growth of the public domain and 
conceivably even has an ownership interest in the materials at issue.182 
Next, the panoptic approach moves from identifying individuals and entities 
to e:iamining any societal interests at stake. In disputes affecting the public· 
domain, this would require recognition of the fact that access to a robust and 
ever-expanding public domain is essential to the progress of society.183 Such 
material allows the public to gain valuable information that is necessary for an 
enlightened citizenry.184 A prodigious public domain al,so advances learning, 
knowledge, and creativity by permitting later authors and innovators to build on 
prior works and discoveries. 
182 See supra Part III.c. 
183 Balkin, supra note 47, at 4-5. 
184 Patry, supra note 5, at 381. 
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Furthermore, in connection with cyberspace-based controversies, this should 
also include an acknowledgement of the benefits that inure from a diverse, open · 
network. The early Internet flourished in large part because "the default rule was 
to allow common access and use of resources."185 As one leading commentator 
asserts, such openness "fueled the greatest technological revolution that our 
culture has seen since the Industrial Revolution."186 Concededly, it is not always 
easy to ascertain the direct rewards of an open network. Nonetheless, the failure 
to appreciate the importance of public access to ideas and information in the 
online world could likely lead to a reduction in innovation, as well as an inability 
to realize the "educational, political, scientific, and cultural promise of the 
Internet. "187 
Another possible interest that arguably merits discussion is that of "wealth 
maximization." Economists that ascribe to an efficiency theory contend that the 
basic purpose of a property system is to "ensure that resources are allocated to. 
their highest valued use" with the objective of increasing monetary rewards. 188 
Accordingly, in order to facilitate the realization of this goal, these economists 
argue that a system of clearly defined property rights is essential.189 Such a 
structure would allow for private bargaining which can assess the worth ofa given 
resource as defined by the price paid in connection with the market transaction. 190 
However, "informational works affect individual and social [welfare] in a variety 
ofways, many of which are not registered, much less measured, by markets."191 
As a result, neoclassical economic theory pushes in an opposite direction, 
185 Hunter, supra note 169, at 507. 
186 LESSIG, supra note 5, at xxii. 
187 Boyle, supra note 52, at 89; see also Hunter, supra note 169, at 446, 518. 
188 Ryan, supra note 6, at 656 (citing Computer Assocs. Int'] v. Althai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d 
Cir. 1992)). . 
189 Julie Cohen, Lochnerin Qyberspace: TheNe1v Economic Orthodo:,ry of''Rights Management, "97 MICH. 
L. REV. 462 (1998); Ryan, supra note 6, at 656-57. 
190 Ryan, supra note 6, at 656-57; Cohen, supra note 189. 
191 Cohen, supra note 189, :J.t 539; see also SINGER, supra note 12, at 124 ("[E]fficiency analysis has 
fundamental drawbacks. First, by suggesting that we measure costs and benefits by market values, 
it assumes that market prices are accurate proxies for social utility or welfare. . . . The point, 
however, is that market measures draw our attention away (rom such costs because there is no 
market for social norms and no market value for trust."). 
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supporting a diminished public domain.192 Consequently, this "intere.st" is overall 
of quite questionable merit. 
By identifying all of the parties and interests involved in a given controversy, 
the effects of the "owner" label are mitigated. In allocating the burdens of 
justifying access to ideas or information, the outcome-determinative nature of 
classifying the holder of any easily identifiable tangible property or the content 
producer as "owner" is avoided. Unlike the traditional method ofproperty rights 
analysis judges and policy makers usually employ, the panoptic approach 
precludes an initial assignment ofrights that prejudges the result. 193 For example, 
with regard to controversies involving access to and the use of information on 
publicly accessible websites, this would mean that the Internet website owner 
would not automatically be deemed the "owner," with the entity seeking access 
forced into a position ofhaving to justify such an intrusion of the website owner's 
rights. 
Additionally, such an approach more readily recognizes that the granting of 
any type ofproperty right, particularly one concerning information, has "powerful 
social consequences."194 Accordingly, limitations on the rights traditionally 
conferred to an owner may be necessary not only to protect other parties with 
compelling needs but also to safeguard important societal values. As such, 
ownership under this model no longer equates with complete control. 
C. EVALUATING THE INTERESTS 
The panoptic approach does not, however, conclude here. Building upon the 
foundation set out above, the panoptic approach next turns to the prospect of 
balancing the various interests involved in a data-related controversy. A thorough· 
review of the content at issue and the context within which the dispute occurs is 
therefore necessary. 
192 Ryan, supra note 6, at 657-58 ("Under a neoclassical economic justification for copyright, 
therefore, authors of creative expression must be afforded broad proprietary rights that extend to 
every conceivable valuable use. Thus, while 'the incentive approach tends to look critically at 
copyright's expansion, questioning whether greater protection is necessary to provide an economic 
incentive for the production of creative works,' the neoclassic economic approach 'has pushed 
economic analysis in the opposite direction. It supports expanded intellectual property rights and 
a diminished public domain.'") (quoting Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
Socie!J', 106 YALELJ. 283, 308 (1996)). 
193 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 6, at 685-86 (discussing the risk that the outcome in many fair use 
cases is predetermined based on an initial assignment of rights to the copyright holder). 
194 Lipton, supra note 15, at 143--44; see also Lemley, supra note 17, at 542 ("The rights and 
remedies we give to private property owners depend in part on the social value ofallocating control 
to the property owner and the social value ofthe use that defendants make ofthat property."); Ryan, 
s11pra note 6, at 647. 
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1. Content. With regard to this component of the panoptic approach, the 
question becomes what type of information is at the center of the controversy. · 
Although copyright law is not sufficiently equipped to provide all of the answers 
in controversies involving information rights,195 it does help inform part of the 
analysis. Therefore, with regard to content, important questions would include 
whether the resource at issue consists solely ofcopyrighted material, only ofnon­
copyrightable works, or a combination thereof. If copyrightable materials are 
involved, will only unprotected portions ofsuch works be utilized? Alternatively, 
ifprotected portions are being used, does such use potentially fall within a specific 
limitation articulated in the Copyright Act or qualify as fair use? 
To the extent a particular use does not run afoul of the Copyright Act, the 
public's interest in preserving a robust and ever-expanding public domain would 
initially appear to be on par with or arguably· superior to the interests of an 
individual or entity seeking to control the use of such knowledge resources. This 
would be true notwithstanding the presence of contractual limitations or digital 
rights management systems that would indicate to the contrary. Nonetheless, the 
fact that non-copyrightable information is at issue, while highly persuasive, is not 
determinative. Further examination of the context within which the data-related 
dispute occurs is therefore necessary. · 
2. Context. An evaluation of the context in which the controversy concerning 
knowledge resources arises is oftentimes more critical to ensuring that all of the 
interests and issues involved in the dispute are adequately addressed than a review 
of its content. This is due to the fact that context frequently pushes tl1e 
competing proprietary and societal interests to the forefront. 196 While 
safeguarding the continued growth of the public .domain as well as removing 
impediments to the public's access to ideas and information are critical, in some 
circumstances these important goals must nonetheless give way to other property­
related values. 
Three examples of data-related disputes concerning identical content, but 
involving very different contexts, help illustrate this point: · 
' 
:" ·1 
195 See Jessica Litman, Reforming Injom1ation Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L REV. 587, 
590 (1997) ("[C]opyright doctrine is ill-adapted to accommodate many oftheimportantinterests that 
inform our information policy. First Amendment, privacy, and distributional issues that copyright 
has treated only glancingly are central to any information policy."). 
196 SINGER, st1pra note 12, at 174, 206 ("Two concli'isions follow from this analysis. First, 
property rights will differ depending on the context within which they are exercised and the effects 
they have on other actors; and second, they must be redefined over time to prevent the illegitimate 
concentration ofpower in ways that keep individuals from participating in the market system on fair 
and equal terms."); UNDERKUFFLER, Stipra note 59, at 27 ("[P]roperty rights-although involving 
the same 'things' and the same theories ofrights-may be affo.rded more or less stringent protection 
because of the different contexts in which those rights appear." (emphasis in original)). 
--------------·-------~--­
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Example #1: A non-original, alphabetically organized list of data 
contained within an individual's briefcase. 
Clearly, the information at issue would not be protectable under the Copyright 
Act.197 Nonetheless, this hypothetical provides a good illustration of a situation 
in which important interests, such as individual control of chattels for reasons of 
protecting individual security and autonomy, 198 come into direct conflict with the 
public's interest in accessing and utilizing information. While the panoptic 
approach does not mandate a particular result, this would be a relatively clear 
example of a situation in which personal property interests should take 
precedence over public interests. 
Example #2: A non-original, alphabetically organized list of data 
appearing on a publicly accessible website. 
Here, the website owner's interests might be said to include the 
encouragement and reward of individual investment, 199 the capacity to control 
access and use ofinformation published on the Internet site, as well as the ability 
to manage the computer server's capacity. However, equally strong, if not more 
persuasive, are the public advantages that come from a diverse, open exchange of 
information, which include the potential for increased competition and 
innovation. Furthermore, placing a publicly accessible site on the Internet should 
indicate consent to at least a certain level of use of the information, particularly 
in light of the attendant benefits the website owner invariably receives from the 
. open nature of the site. zoo 
Example #3: A non-original, alphabetically organized list of data 
contained within a password-protected website. 
197 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also supra Part II 
( discussing originality as a prerequisite for protection under the Act). 
198 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 59, at 90 ("Nixon's claim involved core values-individual use 
and control ofchattels for reasons ofprotecting individual security, autonomy, ~d the products of 
labour-which are traditionally associated with the right to property."). 
199 See id. at 91 ("The patent claim in this case involves core values that we associate with property 
rights. The state ofaffairs that it attempts to achieve or protect-that ofindividual use and control 
of a valuable commodity-is something that we clearly associate with the right to property. In 
addition, the reasons that are traditionally cited for this protection-such as the encouragement of 
individual initiative, the rewarding ofinvestment, the need to protect individual reliance and security, 
and so on-are among those associated with property rights."). 
200 Patricia Bellia, Defending CyberpropertJ, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2207 (2004); Galbraith, supra 
note 112, at 361-63; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Properry Rights and ~on,petition on the Intemet: 111 Search of 
an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 620 (2001). 
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This scenario involves many of the same interests that were raised in 
connection with the previous two examples. However, in this hypothetical the 
website owner's claims in favor of its ability to control access to the site are 
certainly strengthened. First, this website owner has not accrued any network 
benefits associated with public access to an Internet site. Additionally, the 
absence of any sort of implied consent to access the site, which is arguably 
present in the previous example, also lends considerable support to the website 
owner's position. As the foregoing examples illustrate, an examination of°both 
content and context is critical to resolving any data-related disputes or formulating 
information policy. 
D. PUTTING THE PANOPTIC APPROACH IN PERSPECTIVE 
The panoptic approach in no way prescribes the result of a particular 
controversy. However, it does ensure that the parochial method of analysis 
traditionally employed in disputes concerning knowledge resources is· replaced 
with a decisionmaking framework that takes account of the multi-dimensional 
nature of such conflicts. No longer would a website owner.automatically be 
granted the unrestrained ability to dictate limitations on access to its site, 
particularly if it were open to the public. Similarly, contractual provisions 
restricting the use ofideas and data would require more than a perfunctory review 
before being upheld. Additionally, technological measures that impede fair use 
and other non-infringing activities would need to be more closely evaluated. 
The panoptic approach more readily takes into account all relevant parties and 
important societal interests in arriving at a resolution. Such a model requires 
judges and lawmakers to directly confront the value choices they are making in 
fashioning information rights policies. In doing so, this paradigm facilitates 
cognizance of the effects decisions concerning knowledge resources have on the 
continued existence of a prodigious public domain. 
Before concluding, it bears mentioning that application of the panoptic 
approach is by no means simple or straightforward. 201 However, as this article 
illustrates, controversies concerning knowledge resources are not generally 
amenable to a bright-line approach. Formulating information policy is inherently 
complex and does not lend itself to the use of clearly defined property rights. 
Accordingly, the goal of the panoptic approach is not to ~et forth an analytical 
framework that generates an effortless process but instead one that effectuates the 
proper result. 
201 See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, s11pra note 59, at 133 ("This understanding of property is, 
admittedly; not always an easy one. The idea that property's p~esumptive power depends upon the 
context in which it is asserted is often neither simple nor tidy."). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the way in which property rights are 
structured significantly impacts the public domain. Unfortunately, the increasing 
propertizati.on ofinformation is occurring without a thorough examination ofthe 
likely effects. However, "[i]f we approach property rights as one of the most 
important vehicles for structuring relations of power in our society ... we will 
start off the debate in a useful way."202 The panoptic approach is designed to 
advance such a discussion in connection with knowledge resources. 
202 ] ennifer Nedelsky, Rcconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD./REVUE E'ETUDES 
CONSTITUTIONNELLES 1, 16 (1993); see also SINGER, mpra note 12, at 95. 
